French Spyware Executives Are Indicted for Aiding Torture

The mana­gers are accu­sed of selling tech to Libya and Egypt that was used to iden­tify acti­vists, read private messa­ges, and kidnap, torture, or kill them.

 

Earlier this week, French autho­ri­ties indic­ted four former execu­ti­ves of the survei­llance firm Nexa Tech­no­lo­gies, formerly called Amesys, for compli­city in torture and war crimes. Between 2007 and 2014, the firm alle­gedly supplied survei­llance tools to autho­ri­ta­rian regi­mes in Libya and Egypt.

A coali­tion inclu­ding the Inter­a­ti­o­nal Fede­ra­tion for Human Rights, the Cairo Insti­tute for Human Rights Studies, and other human rights groups claim the repres­sive govern­ments of former Libyan dicta­tor Moam­mar Gadhafi and Egyp­tian Presi­dent Abdel Fattah al-Sisi used the tools to iden­tify dissi­dents and acti­vists, read their private emails and messa­ges, and, in some cases, kidnap, torture, or kill them.

Nexa’s execu­ti­ves are accu­sed of selling inter­net survei­llance equip­ment that inter­cep­ted the emails, texts, and Face­book messa­ges of jour­na­lists and dissi­dents. Execu­ti­ves alle­gedly sold the tech to Gadha­fi’s Libyan govern­ment in 2007 and Egypt in 2014. The indic­ted indi­vi­du­als include the former head of Amesys, Philippe Vannier, former presi­dent Stép­hane Salies, and two current Nexa execu­ti­ves: presi­dent Olivier Bohbot and mana­ging direc­tor Renaud Roques. Efforts to reach the men through Nexa were unsuc­cess­ful.

The inves­ti­ga­ting judges of the crimes against huma­nity and war crimes unit of the Paris Judi­cial Court will review the evidence to deter­mine whet­her the four execu­ti­ves will be tried in crimi­nal court.

Such indict­ments are exce­e­dingly rare. Nati­o­nal secu­rity experts say inter­na­ti­o­nal markets for expor­ting survei­llance tools are largely unre­gu­la­ted. The makers of such equip­ment often push back against restric­ti­ons, even those inten­ded to safe­guard against misuse. A 2017 effort from Euro­pean jour­na­lists esti­ma­ted there were over 230 survei­llance compa­nies head­quar­te­red within the EU.

“By and large, there’s little that the autho­ri­ties are requi­red to do to curb this toxic market, ” says Mari­etje Scha­ake, the inter­na­ti­o­nal policy direc­tor at Stan­ford Univer­sity’s Cyber Policy Center and a former member of the Euro­pean Parli­a­ment. While in parli­a­ment, Scha­ake suppor­ted new restric­ti­ons on exports of cyber­sur­vei­llance tech from Europe to coun­tries with a history of human rights viola­ti­ons.

Intro­du­ced by EU lawma­kers in 2016 and passed last year, these new rules require firms to obtain licen­ses to export certain “dual use” tech­no­lo­gies, such as soft­ware capa­ble of survei­llance, hacking, or extrac­ting data. Govern­ments revi­e­wing license appli­ca­ti­ons must assess the like­li­hood the tools will be used to infringe on human rights.

The indict­ment of the French execu­ti­ves stems from sales that predate the new EU regu­la­ti­ons, but Scha­ake hopes they send a message that it’s possi­ble to enforce controls on cyber survei­llance equip­ment. She says it’s much easier to regu­late sales before the products are in other coun­tries. Often, it’s Western coun­tries that are most resis­tant to this idea.

“By and large, there’s little that the autho­ri­ties are requi­red to do to curb this toxic market.” 

Mari­etje Scha­ake, inter­na­ti­o­nal policy direc­tor, Stan­ford Cyber Policy Center

“Compa­nies frame these tools as being used for coun­te­ring terro­rism, ” Scha­ake says. “The ones who are truly respon­si­ble for tortu­ring or kidnap­ping are the states doing that, but the compa­nies are provi­ding crucial tools to enable it.”

Concerns about the sales to Libya and Egypt date to 2011’s “Arab spring, ” when jour­na­lists and privacy groups raised alarms that US and Euro­pean compa­nies furnis­hed survei­llance gear to oppres­sive regi­mes.

In both the US and EU, export controls have evol­ved in a piece­meal fashion, with secu­rity firms saying over­broad restric­ti­ons can pena­lize rese­arch, coun­ter­ter­ro­rism, or other legi­ti­mate uses of the soft­ware and human rights groups empha­si­zing their poten­tial in abet­ting autho­ri­ta­ri­a­nism.

Last Octo­ber the US upda­ted its own rules contro­lling export of poten­ti­ally dange­rous soft­ware. The Depart­ment of Commerce says it will now take human rights consi­de­ra­ti­ons into account when appro­ving or denying licen­ses for compa­nies to make inter­na­ti­o­nal sales. As in the EU, the change comes after seve­ral failed bids for an over­haul. But what that means, prac­ti­cally, is still up in the air.

“You have to think about it in terms of the growing atten­tion that human rights are recei­ving in both Euro­pean and US circles and the grea­ter atten­tion that’s being put on human rights abuses in China and other places, ” says Garrett Hinck, a nati­o­nal secu­rity rese­ar­cher at Colum­bia Univer­sity.

Hinck explains that human rights orga­ni­za­ti­ons that lobby for reining in exports of survei­llance gear are often the driving forces of these chan­ges. Sustai­ned public pres­sure from these acti­vists have led to change in the US and EU. But these same coun­tries are home to some of the most power­ful and profi­ta­ble soft­ware firms that oppose such chan­ges.

Photo­graph: Getty Images